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Wharton School · February 10, 2011

Due diligence on a roll-up: lessons from a luxury optical deal

In a Wharton guest lecture, John Poerink of Linley Capital walks MBA students through how his firm diligenced a roll-up of luxury optical stores. Worth watching for the practical detail: why diligence fees can hit 10% of deal value, what lenders actually read, and the supplier terms that made and threatened the deal.

  • John Poerink · Head, Linley Capital
  • Wharton MBA students · Audience questions, Wharton School
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Key points
  • Poerink treats due diligence as far wider than the financials: macroeconomics, the industry, the operating model, management, and legal and environmental risk.
  • He says diligence fees on a $100 million deal can reach $10 million, so when to put advisers on retainer is a judgement call, and hiring early can show sellers you are committed.
  • Banks do limited diligence of their own and rely on the buyer's adviser reports, so thorough reports from the accountants and consultants help get lenders on side.
  • A consolidation play needs a large fragmented market with no dominant player, sizeable acquisition platforms, an inefficient market and clear gross margin gains.
  • Financial diligence on the optical stores found 250 to 300 days payable outstanding, a supplier practice that was both the deal's edge and its biggest risk.
  • He calls unaudited financials at a privately held target a major red flag that needs very good accountants on the financial due diligence.

The stores were getting their inventory for free. When John Poerink's team ran financial due diligence on a group of luxury optical retailers, they found 250 to 300 days payable outstanding on the balance sheet (around 1:07:50). Poerink says the trade had an age-old practice: you buy the inventory, but you don't pay unless you've sold it. When his team asked one owner why he hadn't paid his bills, the answer was that the suppliers never bother them. Frames still unsold after 250 days went back to Cartier in a box, for a credit.

“I've actually won auction processes not by paying the highest price, but having the best structured deal, having the best relationship with the management team.”

John Poerink, Head, Linley Capital

That finding sits at the centre of this Wharton guest lecture. Poerink, who heads the private equity firm Linley Capital, came to deals through corporate M&A, first for the Benetton family and later at Les Wexner's Limited Brands. He tells the MBA class up front that this will not be an accounting class. Instead he takes one small retail roll-up and uses it to show how his firm decides what is a good investment and what is not, pulling students into the discussion as he goes.

“When you do a hundred million dollar transaction, before you know it, you're spending $10 million in due diligence fees.”

John Poerink, Head, Linley Capital

His main argument is that due diligence is much broader than the numbers. Poerink says it runs from top to bottom: first the macroeconomic environment, then the industry and its competitive set, the operating model, comparable transactions, the financials, management and legal. He says buyers become myopically focused on the financials of a business without taking a step back to ask whether they should be looking at that industry in the first place. His legal example is a roll-up of about a thousand gas stations, where leaking tanks can leave you with huge environmental liabilities you didn't foresee (around 32:12).

“If you want to get a bank on your side, it's good to have a thorough Bain report and a thorough KPMG report.”

John Poerink, Head, Linley Capital

Running all of that is the sponsor's real job, in Poerink's telling. His firm manages a team of 30 to 40 people on a transaction: Kirkland & Ellis on legal, KPMG on financial due diligence, Bain on growth strategy, and specialist firms for management assessments. The bill adds up fast. Poerink says that on a hundred million dollar deal you can be spending $10 million in diligence fees before you know it, so you have to be careful when you pull the trigger on hiring advisers. He adds that you can't wait too long either, because the sellers need to see you are committed enough to spend the money (around 34:45).

“If you're doing that with a dominant player in the market, you're dead in the water.”

John Poerink, Head, Linley Capital

A student asks when the next consulting hour stops being worth paying for. Poerink calls that the art of what his firm does, and says it is typically better to have more due diligence information than less. His team often disagrees with KPMG, with Bain and with its own operating advisers. The point, he says, is an outside opinion on each part of the deal, so you are not caught by surprise. Things will never work out exactly the way you expect them to.

The same reports do a second job with the lenders. Asked how banks changed after the crisis, Poerink recalls 2005 and 2006, when banks were throwing money at you and his firm took three times debt when offered four, something he says 95% of private equity firms would not have done (around 44:13). Banks are smarter now, he says, but their own diligence work is still very limited. They lean on the investment bank's material, which he calls usually worthless (while crediting some smaller middle market banks with very thorough work), and on the buyer's reports. Thorough consultant, accounting, management and environmental reports get a bank over the hump.

On consolidation plays themselves, Poerink is blunt: they are incredibly difficult and a lot of them fail. His checklist from the optical deal is a large fragmented market with no dominant player, relatively large acquisition platforms, an inefficient market and clear gross margin gains from suppliers. Where a dominant player already exists, he says, suppliers won't care that you are double the size. In an efficient market the owners pick up the phone to each other and start negotiating together, which he says happened on this deal (around 1:02:23). Luxury optical passed the test: a $400 million niche of mom and pop boutiques, about 3% of a $20 billion optical market.

Management is where Poerink admits to mistakes. In one portfolio company his firm did not hire people to evaluate the whole team, then had to change the CEO. He calls that incredibly destabilising for a $500 million business, where the CEO goes and the CFO follows because they were friends. His test is the track record, and the hard question is whether a team that grew a business from $100 million to $500 million can run one at $2 billion. Usually, he says, not without guidance, added hires or training.

Back to the optical deal. A student points out that the supplier terms cut both ways: if suppliers push payable days down from 260 towards 200, cash flow takes an immense hit. Poerink tells him he hit the nail on the head, because this is what happened, though the lecture runs out of time before he explains how (around 1:09:56). His parting advice is about price. He tells the class that the discipline of buying companies on the cheap is the single biggest driver of returns. Overpay, and even a sound business will disappoint when you sell it.

Why it matters

For anyone running a diligence process, Poerink's point is that the financials are one workstream among many, and that lenders end up reading the same adviser reports the buyer commissions. Plan the timing of those reports, and what goes into the data room, with both audiences in mind.

Summary and analysis by VirtualData-Room.com from the public video. Play it above; the original source is linked there.